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The politics and analytics of health policy
Introduction
Let us start with an example of health policy analysis in action. 
Within that category of countries loosely known as ‘the West’, 
quite basic differences exist in attitudes to health policy and also 
actual health policy. Comparing the US with mainland Europe 
and indeed Canada, for example, one perceives a difference 
in attitude on the part of the majority towards collectivism 
and individualism in access to, provision of and financing of 
healthcare. The explanation for policy and system differences—
for example, between the US healthcare system(s) and the 
various NHSs of the UK countries (England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland)—is commonly framed in terms of ‘ideology’ 
but there are also ‘institutional’ explanations (1). Additionally, 
however, popular attitudes or ‘values’ may be taken as 
autonomous ‘inputs’ into the explanation (e.g. ‘American values 
prevent the enactment of an NHS’) or, at least in part, derived 
from or influenced by institutional reality. If, for example, there 
is no chance of a bill to establish an NHS or a comprehensive 
system of public health insurance passing in Washington, then 
reformers over time trim not only their legislative ambitions, 
but also their very way of thinking about the issue.
In this case, what we might be observing is the interplay of 
ideas and institutions (2): ideas about what is possible are 
influenced over time, and that can—over an even longer period 
of time—lead to those ideas coalescing into an ‘ideology’ of 
what is desirable (i.e. politics as the art of the possible, where 
the practitioners eventually internalise the possible as the 
(most) desirable state-of-affairs). Institutions shape ideology. 
And conversely, ideology can shape institutions: approaches 
to change (e.g. incremental versus comprehensive; marginal 
versus radical) can affect how politicians and other actors 
behave within political institutions, and whether they accept 
the standard-operating procedures or challenge them.
Policy analysis may be descriptive and analytical (positive as 
opposed to normative, in the language of economics)—what 
policy do we see, and why? Alternatively it may be normative 
—what policy do we wish to see and how can we get it? In a 
separate but related vein, health policy for some will tend to be 
studied with overtones of ‘positivism’ (which I will define here 
as seeking patterns in data without necessarily explaining them 
at the level of human perception and action), whereas for others 
it will involve a rich range of ‘policy studies’ involving things 
like who holds power, what the structures are, which condition 
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(and possibly ‘bias’) decision-making and the emergence of 
policy, and how implementation is affected by behavioural as 
well as ‘technical’ factors.
Health policy and politics
My own perspective is that policy is a reflection of politics and 
that to study health policy is to study the politics of public policy 
as applied to health.  This perspective sees health policy as part 
of political science, drawing upon sociology and other social 
sciences, but not seeing any of these in too autarchic terms. 
Furthermore, this perspective may see health policy as not only 
being derived from prevailing politics, but also as helping to 
constitute the nature of politics. To give an example of what this 
may mean, Moran’s term ‘the healthcare state’ points to what he 
calls the ‘mutual embeddedness’ of healthcare and the state (3). 
The state influences the nature of the healthcare system(s) and 
trends within the healthcare system (for example, the demands 
for healthcare made by powerful or pivotal groups) influence 
the (changing) nature of the state and of politics more generally 
(i.e. society-wide).
For some, policy is ‘management’ as opposed to management 
being the derivative of policy (i.e. its application, both in 
implementation and in the running of ‘the system’ post-
implementation). Here, on the one hand, we may detect the 
influence of the ‘new public management’, and the alleged 
supercession of the ‘old’ public administration. Politics has 
reached the ‘end of ideology’—not in Bell’s (4) sense of a social-
democratic compromise between Western capitalism and 
Soviet ‘communism’ as seen from a vantage point at the end of 
the ‘first’ Cold War of the 1950s, but in the sense that ‘we are all 
capitalists now’, a stance often disguised as the seemingly more 
neutral statement that the scope of politics is diminished by 
allegedly inexorable trends in the nature and role of the ‘modern 
state’. In what might have been called ‘the advanced Western 
capitalist state’ in the 1960s and 1970s, we are seeing since the 
1980s or 1990s the decline of politics as ideological choice and 
the diminution of politics to choice amongst different tribes 
of technocrats using different discourse for their core party 
support from that which they use to the centre-ground, and 
which constrains their policy when and if elected.
And it is not too fanciful to see the ‘ideological closure’ in 
core capitalist countries around neo-liberal health policy 
options as reflecting a reality which is welcome to some and 
pragmatically-accepted by others. In this connection, we 
may note that England is a core capitalist country (where the 
dominant health policy discourse is now of the market, and 
‘insider’ networks, including supposedly ‘neutral’ institutes, 
do not challenge this) and the other UK countries, on the 
periphery, overtly reject such a discourse. 
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Health policy and social science
Firstly, the so-called positivist or ‘quantitative’ approach is not, 
or should not be, a methodology for studying human behaviour, 
but something rather different—a tool for e.g. allowing 
correlations to be observed, investigated further and issues of 
causality tentatively hypothesized. Secondly, to investigate such 
a hypothesis further, human behaviour will probably have to 
be researched using ‘qualitative’ means of research. But these 
camps become polarised when positivism is practised without 
acknowledging the need for complementary explanation; and 
when ‘anti-positivism’ dissolves into the unhelpful relativism 
that there is ‘no such thing as truth’.
Correlations without causality are dangerous. Inversely, the 
stance that each observer has his own truth is compelling 
but misleading:  to argue that all truth is based on the eye of 
the beholder, and to see social ‘truth’ as constructed as if in a 
negotiation rather than a discovery, ignores the fact that there 
is a domain of material reality. The indeterminacy of human 
action (e.g. over space and time) is not the same as saying that 
different observers cannot observe the same thing at the same 
time, in the same place. Where interpretivism has its own realm 
is where the study of human perception, emotion, motivation, 
and intention is needed to explain action, or the effect of the 
former upon the latter. 
In health policy, the ‘extreme positivist’ approach has been 
exemplified recently by research in England which has been used 
to argue that market forces are beneficial in public healthcare 
systems on the basis that ‘competition saves lives’ (5). Without 
denying that statistical correlations have been achieved, it 
is difficult to suggest without a further complementary, but 
different type of research that the hypothesis has been proved. 
There are many reasons why this is not the case, and that ‘health 
policy’ conclusions drawn from uni-disciplinary, deductive 
research are flawed and quite possibly irresponsible (6). 
Health policy: less bold but wiser?
Insight into the evolution of health policy is gained by tracing its 
historical link to healthcare system evolution—again, chicken 
or egg? As systems developed in the direction of socialization, in 
Europe, Canada, Australasia, certain Latin American countries 
and (derivatively) in certain African and Asian colonies, the 
characteristics they acquired led to seminal studies in sociology 
and political science which sought to explain. Later, the era 
of conservative retrenchment and privatization led to further 
theorisation. Predictably, there have attempts to ‘over-theorise’ 
each of these epochs, usually allied to giving too much credence 
to the more apocalyptic claims about what is happening in 
the real world (e.g. progressive reform in the 1960s and 1970s 
claimed to be the wave of the future;  conservative reaction 
from the 1980s claimed to have destroyed the welfare state and 
globalisation suggested to make equitable healthcare systems 
impossible in individual nation-states).
The reality is inevitably more messy in practice and complex 
in theory. For example, it was always unlikely that there was 
one organisational fix to achieve (for example) the aims of 
progressive reformers in the health policy arena who wish 
healthcare to be comprehensive, universal and free-at the-
point-of-use. There are better and worse Beveridge systems and 
better and worse Bismarckian systems (7). Some of each focus 
minimally upon security, possible for ethical reasons, more 
likely for conservative reasons. Some of each are more ambitious, 
seeing access to affordable healthcare for all as part of human or 
at least citizen rights and part of enabling individuals to flourish 
through collective financing and possible provision. Equally, 
conservative trends on a global basis do not lead to uniform 
retrenchment or similar reforms in countries across the world.
In a similar spirit, one should note, for example, that attempts to 
achieve similar goals in different healthcare systems should not 
be based upon ‘organisational copy-cattism’, which may include 
what Marmor calls ‘fads, fallacies and foolishness in medical 
care policy and management’ (8). Do not be fooled or dismayed 
by Marmor’s use of the term ‘medical’ as opposed to ‘health’: it 
is surely a virtue to imply that, while health in the wider sense 
depends upon much beyond the reach of medical care, most 
‘healthcare systems’ are mostly medical care systems and it may 
be naive to assume that such systems should take on the burden 
of promoting health on an equitable basis (i.e. should be held 
responsible for sweeping up the detritus produced by economic 
inequality and its consequences, social deprivation, and 
environmental despoliation on an inegalitarian basis). Instead 
wider economic and social policy should shoulder that burden.
Inter-disciplinary study
Let us consider a classic ‘inter-disciplinary study’—by an 
economist who was interested in political science, Albert 
Hirschman (9). His famous study, Exit, Voice and Loyalty is not 
about health policy at all. Hirschman was interested in what 
happened when consumers, citizens or party-members  sought 
to influence their providers, government or party; and what 
happened when company owners, employees, the state or party 
decision-makers reacted to market conditions, incentives or 
such influence of whatever sort from consumers of whatever 
sort. Influence was conceptualised in terms of ‘exit’, which we 
might term market choice of provider; ‘voice’, which we might 
term a desire to be a stakeholder with a preferred or ‘one’s own’ 
provider rather than abandon it; and ‘loyalty’, which is a value 
in possible conflict with the user’s desire for improvement 
of one sort or another.
Hirschman showed what happened (for example) when certain 
‘theoretical’ assumptions were pragmatically, realistically, or 
hypothetically relaxed; when monopoly providers were ‘lazy’ 
(‘satisficing’ and making ‘enough’ profit rather than maximising 
and producing ‘super-normal’ profits); when market choice 
worked ‘too quickly’ to allow providers to improve; when 
providers could survive by specialising in monopoly ‘niches’ 
rather than seeking to improve quality as a result of consumer/
user pressure; and so on. It is instructive to apply his approach 
to the health sector, as I have suggested with ‘market reform’ in 
the English NHS (10,11).
In a broader sense, Hirschman demonstrates by example the 
sort of analysis necessary, on the one hand, when the ‘ideal type’ 
assumptions of different disciplines are relaxed one-by-one 
and/or, on the other hand, when core assumptions drawn from 
different disciplines are selectively brought together (which 
may amount to the same thing). 
If we are interested in getting beyond sterile conflicts (or worse, 
mutual ignorance) between academic disciplines, then this type 
of approach is promising in helping us to understand why often 
unexpected things happen. And if we have values which we 
wish to promote in undertaking health reform, then political 
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studies help us understand the scale of the task we face.
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